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This article shows that higher ethno-linguistic diversity is associated
with a greater risk of social tensions and conflict, which in turn is a
dispersion force lowering urbanization and the incentives to move to
big cities. We construct a novel worldwide data set at a fine-grained
level on urban settlement patterns and ethno-linguistic population
composition. For 3,540 provinces of 170 countries, we find that in-
creased ethno-linguistic fractionalization and polarization are asso-
ciated with lower urbanization and an increased role for secondary
cities relative to the primate city of a province. These striking associ-
ations are quantitatively important and robust to various changes in
variables and specifications. We find that democratic institutions af-
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The conflict literature has found that ethnic diversity1 within a region can induce tensions and raise the po-2
tential for conflict (1–3). Existing game-theoretic models of3
spatial distributions of ethnic groups and social tensions (4)4
predict that, in the presence of tensions between groups, con-5
flicts are more costly when bigger numbers of members of6
different groups live at close range. To avoid such conflict7
costs caused by inter-group hostility, members of ethnic groups8
have an incentive to remain dispersed in the countryside as9
opposed to moving to cities to live in close quarters. Further,10
when they do urbanize, instead of agglomerating into one11
giant regional “melting pot” megapolis, they may spread over12
smaller cities.13
This paper presents what is, to the best of our knowledge,14
the first global empirical investigation of the nexus between15
ethno-linguistic diversity and major patterns of where people16
live within countries. We show that initial ethnic diversity re-17
duces urban agglomeration. This has important consequences18
as policies which inhibit urbanization and urban concentration19
can strongly restrict economic growth (5, 6). Yet, economists20
have largely ignored the role of ethno-linguistic cleavages when21
studying agglomeration benefits, urbanization and develop-22
ment, the size distribution of cities, and policies which impact23
concentration (7–14).24
Many anecdotal examples of the impact of ethno-linguistic25
diversity on urbanization patterns may come to mind. One26
example is the archetypical bilingual city of Montreal which has27
stagnated in size since the 1960s, while nearby predominantly28
English-speaking cities like Toronto or French-speaking cities29
like Quebec-Ville have typically grown by at least 50% over30
the same time period (15). As a more structured example we31
pick the two Indian states with the highest degree of ethno-32
linguistic diversity in India as measured by fractionalization,33
a common measure of diversity in the literature which we34
define later. These states, Nagaland and Himachal Pradesh,35
are also in the top 3% of degree of diversity by provinces 36
worldwide and Nagaland is at the center of India’s well known 37
on-going conflict in its Northeast. These highly fractionalized 38
states rank in the top 6% and 3%, respectively, of provinces 39
worldwide in incidence of conflict for 1975-2015 (defined below). 40
In terms of the resulting urban concentration, we develop two 41
measures below: share of the population that is urbanized, 42
and primacy (fraction of the urban population in the biggest 43
city in the province). These two Indian states both rank in the 44
bottom 30% worldwide of provinces in terms of urban share 45
and in the bottom 1% in terms of primacy share. In other 46
words, their high degree of ethnic fractionalization and conflict 47
is closely associated with people staying in the countryside 48
and avoiding agglomerating into one main city by spreading 49
urban population across cities. 50
To comprehensively assess these relationships, we created 51
a novel, fine-grained data set of geographical population dis- 52
tribution and language use. For 233 countries around the 53
world, these data allow us to compute indices of urban con- 54
centration in the year 2015, as well as ethnolinguistic diversity 55
at the province level in 1975. Provinces are the first-level 56
administrative boundaries within countries such as U.S. states 57
or German Bundesländer (see the SI Appendix, p.5 for de- 58
tails). We identify the effects of ethno-linguistic diversity on 59
urban concentration from within country variation in urban 60
concentration at the provincial level for 3,540 provinces in 61
the 170 countries with more than one province, controlling 62
for the 1975 levels of the variables of interest. Drawing on 63
data of the Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) and the 64
GHS Settlement Model (GHS-SMOD, (16)) on geo-localised 65
population and urban boundaries, we first establish a data set 66
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Fig. 1. Global Map of Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization at the Province Level. Fractionalization is calculated at language tree level 15. See text for data sources and construction.
at the 1 km grid level, which distinguishes between city cores,67
dense towns, semi-dense towns, suburbs and rural areas for68
2015. The GHS project for the first time defines areas such as69
cities, based solely on population and population density mea-70
sures consistently across the world, with no regards to local71
administrative borders and to census bureau qualitative views72
on what defines urban areas and cities. This consistency in73
definition across and within countries is an important feature74
of our contribution.∗75
In this paper, we first match the grid cells with fine-grained76
language information, drawing on the World Language Map-77
ping System (WLMS) data capturing the traditional languages78
(as defined by Ethnologue (18)) present in the early 1990s.79
Ethnologue contains the number of speakers of all languages80
in a given country and WMLS maps the information of the81
Ethnologue into the geographic location of ethno-linguistic82
groups. All details of the data construction are relegated to83
the “Data and Methods” Section below.84
In Figure 1, the average ethno-linguistic fractionalization85
at the province level is displayed graphically for all countries86
for level 15 (which is the most disaggregated level of language87
distinction, as detailed below). In the map, darker colours88
indicate higher levels of ethnic fractionalization. The map89
illustrates the fine-grained data structure and one reason why90
we study our research question at the provincial rather than91
national level. Figure 1 shows that large countries have enor-92
mous within country variation across provinces. Taking the93
province rather than the country as the unit of observation94
allows us to exploit this variation. Moreover, in robustness95
checks, we will show that our results in fact hold for small-96
province countries as well as large-province countries. Another97
key factor is that, given the high inter-provincial migration98
costs in many countries, with evidence for China (19) and99
Indonesia (20), and the role of provinces in governance, the100
province seems a natural way to study our phenomena. In101
addition, in statistical work, province-level data allow us to102
∗There are also country specific efforts to measure urban area sizes based on density of buildings
(e.g. delineating urban areas with building density for France, see (17)), but our outcomes involve
population measures, so we need population data as well as worldwide coverage.
control through country fixed effects for unobservable con- 103
founding country characteristics (like national governance) 104
which also influence the urban structure. 105
Next, using fractionalization as a measure of ethno- 106
linguisitic diversity, we graph three motivating sets of associa- 107
tions. Figure 2 displays the association between a conflict mea- 108
sure and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, as well as between 109
the two urban concentration measures and ethno-linguistic 110
fractionalization, for all provinces across the world. 111
In panel A of Figure 2 we show with a non-linear regression 112
that ethnic fractionalization correlates positively with the 113
count of conflict incidents in each province from 1975 to 2015 114
(based on data from “Geographical Research on War, United 115
Platform”, GrowUP (21)), as postulated at the beginning of 116
the article. This is in line with our premise that ethnic diversity 117
may go in hand with heightened ethnic tensions and conflict. 118
As argued above, this risk of unrest may be a dispersion force, 119
leading to less urbanization and less urban concentration. 120
Hence, panel B of Figure 2 illustrates the correlation at the 121
province level between ethnic fractionalization in 1975 and 122
urban population share in 2015, while panel C displays the 123
relationship of ethnic fractionalization in 1975 and primary 124
city share in 2015. In both cases we detect – at least for 125
intermediate and high levels of ethnic fractionalization – a clear 126
association between ethnic diversity and both urbanization 127
and primacy. 128
Taken together, the correlations suggest that places with 129
greater fractionalization have less urbanization with more peo- 130
ple staying in the countryside and a smaller share of urban 131
population in the primate city of the province, so a bigger 132
share is found in smaller cities. It appears that fractional- 133
ization strongly impacts where people live and the degree of 134
urban concentration. Of course there will be heterogeneity 135
in these relationships. As one example at the end of the pa- 136
per, we consider a policy question of how democratization 137
may influence outcomes, because the extent of democratiza- 138
tion may influence the tensions associated with any degree of 139
ethno-linguistic fractionalization. 140
While the associations in Figure 2 are intriguing, below 141
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Fig. 2. Distributions and Regressions: Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization, Conflict and
Urban Concentration. The unit of observation is a province. The sample includes
3,540 provinces worldwide. The graphs depict kernel-weighted local polynomial
regressions of 1st degree. The plots show the association between different outcome
variables on the vertical axis and fractionalization on the horizontal axis. Each
variable’s country mean is subtracted. Fractionalization is calculated at language tree
level 15 for the year 1975. Panel A: Conflict is reported for 3169 provinces in 154
countries. The outcome variable indicates provinces with at least one ethnic group
involved in a conflict incident (implying at least 25 deaths) during the period 1975-
2015, with data from the Geographical Research on War United Platform. Panels B
and C: Urbanization indices for the year 2015 calculated with data from the Global
Human Settlement Layer. Panel B. Urban share is the share of urban population of a
province divided by the total population; Panel C: Primate share is the population of
the largest city in a province divided by the total population of all other cities in the
province.
we turn to a more full-fledged statistical analysis. For this 142
purpose, we now first discuss in some detail the data and 143
methods before studying these relationships in more depth 144
in a regression analysis, controlling for a variety of potential 145
confounders. 146
Data and Methods. Our urban concentration measures capture 147
the extent to which provincial populations concentrate into 148
cities (Urban), and the extent to which that urbanized popula- 149
tion is found in just one city (Primate). To construct them, we 150
classify each grid cell in the categories city cores (core), dense 151
towns (dense), semi-dense towns (semi), suburban (sub) and 152
rural area (see SI Appendix for a detailed description of defini- 153
tions and algorithms). Given this classification, our dependent 154
variables are defined as: 155
Urbani =








where Popi is the total population of province i in 2015, Pop1sti 159
is the population in the largest city core in province i and 160
Popcorei , Popdensei , Popsemii , and Popsubi correspond to the 161
total population of all grid cells in province i of the respective 162
category. For the urban share equation, we note that urban 163
in the numerator is broadly defined. The GHS project has 164
a low density threshold as part of its urban definitions of 165
semi-dense towns and suburbs (300 per sq km) meaning that, 166
in general, it reports higher urban shares worldwide than the 167
UN World Urbanization Prospects data. However, we are 168
only interested in relative comparisons across provinces within 169
countries. For the primate share equation, we note that, for 170
any specific city, the GHS project only identifies the dense 171
Popcorei population; suburban populations are not assigned 172
to specific core cites. Thus to have a denominator consistent 173
with the numerator in eqn (2), for all cities in a province, we 174
include only dense urban populations, Popcorei and Popdensei . 175
Later, as robustness checks, we will employ a stricter definition 176
of urban share limited to core cities and dense towns in the 177
numerator of eqn (1); and we will use a measure of primate 178
city size that attempts to incorporate commuting zones around 179
cities in eqn (2). 180
As noted above, we match the grid cells with fine-grained 181
language information. Our language data from the World Lan- 182
guage Mapping System (WLMS) is arguably the most precise 183
source currently available, and has recently been used by (22), 184
(23) and (24). The need to disentangle subtle differences in 185
urbanization patterns has required us to construct our data 186
at a more fine-grained level (1 km grid cells) than previous 187
publications. Moreover, we apply the algorithm pioneered by 188
(? ) for allocating languages to population in multi-linguistic 189
areas, which further increases precision. These features and 190
the use of consistent definitions and data sources for urbaniza- 191
tion and linguistic measures account for our dataset being the 192
most precise of its kind currently available. 193
To compute measures of ethno-linguistic diversity we use 194
the Fractionalization measure capturing the degree to which 195
the population is segmented into many different groups at 196
a provincial level. We also show in the appendix results for 197
the Polarization index capturing the extent to which the 198




population is divided into two equal sized and potentially199
opposing groups.200
The reason we focus on ethnic Fractionalization as main201
measure is that it has been linked to both small scale frictions202
in public good provision (25, 26) as well as to large scale203
social conflict and civil wars (2, 27, 28), whereas the use204
of ethnic Polarization has been more confined to the study205
of large-scale wars (e.g. in (1, 2, 28)), making the concept206
arguably narrower and in our view slightly less relevant than207
Fractionalization for studying urbanization outcomes. Thus,208
we use Polarization as alternative measure and relegate it to209
the appendix. Formally, the two measures are defined in the210
literature (1) as:211
Fractionalizationi = 1 −
Mi∑
m=1
(πmi )2 , [3]212
213
Polarizationi = 1 −
Mi∑
m=1
((0.5 − πmi )/0.5)2 πmi , [4]214
where Mi designates the total number of groups m = 1, ...,Mi215
in province i and πmi corresponds to the population share of a216
group m in the province’s total population.217
We populate the language map with 1975 GHS population218
numbers (29), so as to represent language diversity historically.219
Ethnologue has up to 15 levels of distinction yielding 6208220
country-language pairs (e.g. “French-Canada” and “French-221
Switzerland” are two country-language pairs) when applying222
the finest level of language distinction. The information of Eth-223
nologue and WMLS allows us to distinguish ethno-linguistic224
groups at different levels of language affinity; and these in-225
dices can be computed at any of the 15 levels. High levels226
of aggregation distinguish only major language families while227
low levels of aggregation, e.g. level 15, result in distinguishing228
very fine-grained differences between similar languages. Some229
countries such as India have enormous diversity, with 391 lan-230
guages distinguished at the most disaggregated level and 18231
already at level 2.232
As an example, in Figure 3 we graphed the language struc-233
ture for Himachal Pradesh, the above-mentioned province of234
about 7.5 million in northwest India. The figure illustrates235
the branches of its language tree, showing for each branch the236
highest level of disaggregation. The province starts on level 1237
with 2 languages and then proceeds down to its finest division238
at level 8 with 18 final languages and ethnic groups.239
In the main analysis, as in (? ), we shall focus on level 15,240
the highest disaggregation level worldwide. For most states in241
India like Himachal Pradesh, the branches of the tree end at242
levels 6 through 8 (denoted by the underlining end language).243
When looking at level 15, branches ending sooner (say level244
6 or 8) are accounted level 15 language affinity. In Figure S2245
in the SI Appendix, we show a similar graph for Switzerland.246
In the regression analysis, we demonstrate robustness at more247
aggregated levels, where related languages in the tree are248
lumped together.249
Baseline Results. This section systematically studies the as-250
sociation between ethno-linguistic factors and urbanization251
patterns by regressing contemporary measures of urban con-252
centration on historical measures of ethno-linguistic diversity,253
as well as initial urban concentration levels from four decades254
ago, using data from provinces across the world.255
Table 1 displays our results. It is divided into two panels: 256
the top panel A is a cross sectional analysis while the bottom 257
panel B is longitudinal by additionally controlling for the past 258
(1975) value of the dependent variable. Columns are in pairs 259
for different samples and outcomes; and, within each pair, 260
columns are distinguished by the set of controls. 261
Column 1, Panel A regresses the Urban share in a given 262
province in 2015 on pre-sample ethno-linguistic fractionaliza- 263
tion in 1975, yielding a coefficient of -0.126 that is statistically 264
significant at the 1 % level. To give perspective, this means 265
that moving from a perfectly ethno-linguistically homogeneous 266
province (i.e. with ethno-linguistic fractionalization of 0) to a 267
perfectly diverse one (i.e. with ethno-linguistic fractionaliza- 268
tion of 1) would be associated with a 13 percentage points lower 269
share of the urban population in the province. This change in 270
urbanization corresponds to about half a standard deviation of 271
the Urban share measure, or the difference between the very 272
urbanized Netherlands and the less urbanized United States 273
which contains more rural area population. Note that this 274
specification controls for country fixed effects, which means 275
that the estimation is based solely on within-country compar- 276
isons of provinces, filtering out unobserved between-country 277
heterogeneity. There is a concern however that estimates in 278
Panel A could be biased because of omitted variables and 279
reverse causality. For example, urbanization over long periods 280
of time could influence fractionalization. 281
To deal with this, we move in column (1), Panel B to a more 282
demanding specification where we also control for 1975 values 283
of urban share, in which we investigate the impact of fraction- 284
alization on the evolution of urbanization over the following 285
4 decades. A control for the 1975 urban share also controls 286
for the influence of omitted variables at least on historical 287
urbanization, a topic we return to below. Of course, it also 288
sweeps up any impact of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on 289
historical urban share, leading us to potentially understate the 290
total effect of fractionalization on urban share in 2015. How- 291
ever, conditioning on base period urbanization tells us more 292
unambiguously how subsequent urbanization is influenced by 293
baseline fractionalization. When controlling at the province 294
level for urban share in 1975 in Panel B, we still find a statis- 295
tically significant negative coefficient, albeit its magnitude is 296
reduced by half compared to Panel A. Of note, the coefficient 297
of past urban share is sizeable and highly significant, pointing 298
towards a large persistence of urbanization patterns over time. 299
Overall, it is reassuring that in Panel B we continue to find 300
evidence of ethnic fractionalization slowing down the pace of 301
urbanization, after controlling for pre-sample urbanization. 302
In column 2, Panels A and B, we estimate the analogous 303
specifications as in column 1, Panels A and B, but controlling 304
in addition for terrain ruggedness and population density in 305
1975 (see SI Appendix p. 5 for a detailed description of these 306
control variables and Table S2 for all estimated coefficients). 307
The results remain very similar and the coefficients of interest 308
remain statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 309
With regard to the measure of urban concentration, we 310
estimate the same specifications for the share of the primate 311
city in total urban population (Primate). Note that unlike 312
the 1975 urban share, the past primate share from 1975 is 313
only observable for a restricted sample, since some provinces 314
in 1975 did not have a core city (Popcorei ). Hence, we run the 315
regressions of primate share in Panel A on fractionalization first 316
































Gahri Kinnauri Kinnauri Bhoti TinaniShumcho
Mandeali Pahari KulluChambeali Pahari MahasuDogri HinduriBilaspuri Sirmauri
Panjabi
Punjabi, Eastern
Fig. 3. The Use of Ethnologue Language Trees: Illustration for the Indian Province Himachal Pradesh. The graph depicts the language tree of Himachal Pradesh. The
languages of Himachal Pradesh are divided in up to 8 levels, with level 1 being the most aggregated and level 8 being the least aggregated level. The endpoint (underlined) of
each branch depicts the commonly-referred name of a language. The language tree is based on data by the Ethnologue. Four very minor languages at the extension of
Western Pahari are omitted for presentation purposes.
on the full sample (columns 3 and 4) and then on the restricted317
sample (columns 5 and 6) to improve comparability. We find318
that the importance of the biggest city among urbanized319
areas is considerably reduced in the face of ethno-linguistic320
fractionalization. Put differently, ethno-linguistic diversity is321
associated with having several smaller cities instead of a single322
mega city. Quantitatively, moving from a fully homogeneous323
to a fully heterogeneous society (i.e. moving ethno-linguistic324
fractionalization from 0 to 1) would be associated with an325
at least 8 percentage points lower Primate share in columns326
5 and 6 in Panel B, equal to about a quarter of a standard327
deviation of this variable.328
Note that we also carry out a regression analysis linking329
ethnic diversity to conflict. In the interest of space, this330
investigation is relegated to the SI Appendix. In Table S8331
we show that there is a strong and statistically significant332
association between ethno-linguistic fractionalization in 1975333
at the province level and several measures of armed conflict334
between 1975 and 2015 at the province level.335
How robust are our results to various considerations? The336
first concern is omitted variables. In SI Appendix Table S2 our337
results are robust to including further control variables that338
could potentially influence the spread of cities. In particular,339
we control for square and cubic terms of population density, for340
distance to coast, elevation, latitude, provincial GDP and for341
whether the national capital is located in the given province.342
We also control for the degree of historical conflict from 1946-343
1974 to address concerns that initial antagonism may have344
shaped diversity and urbanization in 1975. The SI Appendix345
p.5 contains a detailed description of these control variables.346
Note that these robustness checks can reduce sample size, as347
the additional information is not observed in all countries.348
Coefficients on ethno-lingusitic fractionalization move very349
little in response to varying the sets of controls. Finally, we350
assess the maximum potential remaining bias from omitted 351
(unobserved) variables by performing a test following Altonji 352
et al. (30) and Oster (31). In our specification with most 353
controls for observables, i.e. Panel B of Table 1, we calculate 354
an estimate of the extent of possible bias for the effect of 355
fractionalization of +0.020 for urban share and +0.022 for 356
primate share.† Hence our point estimates remain substantially 357
below zero even allowing for such potential bias. 358
Next for robustness, we show that the overall stability of es- 359
timated coefficients remains when varying the threshold levels 360
in the language tree for distinguishing different languages. As 361
explained above, our data allow us to compute ethno-linguistic 362
diversity measures for different definitions of what constitutes 363
distinct languages. When using an aggregation level of 1, we 364
only distinguish the most fundamental differences in the lan- 365
guage tree, such as the difference between Indo-European and 366
Sino-Tibetan language families, but lump together distinctions, 367
such as Italian and German, into the Indo-European group. In 368
contrast, as we move down the tree, the distinctions become 369
more fine-grained, where local dialects are distinct such as 370
Kangri, Hinduri, and Dogri as dialects of Western Paharai 371
which in turn is related to Punjabi in Figure 3 above; or, say, 372
Arpitan, Romansch, Lombard, and French in Non-German 373
Switzerland (see SI Appendix Figure S2). 374
We graph the pattern of coefficients and their significance 375
in Figure 4, linking ethnic diversity to urban share, primate 376
share and conflict. Overall, the results of Figure 4 highlight 377
the stability of estimated coefficients over a range of possible 378
aggregation levels of the language data. In particular, we 379
observe a statistically significant negative association between 380
ethnic fractionalization, on the one hand, and urban and 381
primate shares, on the other hand, across a wide range of 382
†We calculate the maximum bias with conservative assumptions for this context, i.e. δ = 1 and
R2max = 0.9. See the SI Appendix p.7 for more details and calculation.




Table 1. Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization and Urbanization Patterns.
Dependent variable: Urban share Primate share
Sample: Full sample Full sample Restricted sample
Controls: No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Cross sectional
Fractionalization -0.126∗∗∗ (0.024) -0.107∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.144∗∗∗ (0.025) -0.115∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.212∗∗∗ (0.031) -0.175∗∗∗ (0.028)
Adjusted R2 0.467 0.515 0.360 0.462 0.342 0.459
Panel B: Longitudinal
Fractionalization -0.057∗∗∗ (0.020) -0.054∗∗∗ (0.020) -0.082∗∗∗ (0.026) -0.080∗∗∗ (0.025)
Urban share (1975) 0.612∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.591∗∗∗ (0.048)
Primate share (1975) 0.846∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.819∗∗∗ (0.032)
Adjusted R2 0.732 0.735 0.824 0.826
Provinces 3540 3540 2359 2359 1623 1623
Countries 170 170 154 154 138 138
Country FE X X X X X X
Ruggedness X X X
Population density (1975) X X X
The unit of observation is a province. OLS estimates are reported in all columns. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in
parentheses. “Restricted sample” refers to the set of provinces with data available on the outcome variable for 1975. The regressions control for country
fixed-effects. Statistical significance is represented by ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
possible language aggregation levels. Moreover, the positive383
correlation between ethnic fractionalization and conflict is384
found across the board of different aggregation levels. We385
note that explanatory power of the regressions across all these386
graphed levels varies minimally.‡387
Next we turn to our alternative measure of ethno-linguistic388
diversity. While the fractionalization measure takes high values389
for areas with a large number of groups, the main alternative390
diversity measure defined above, ethno-linguist polarization,391
reaches high values for situations closer to bi-modal distribu-392
tions of a small number of sizeable groups. As discussed above,393
we prefer fractionalization – the arguably somewhat broader394
concept, fitting better the context of urbanization, and have395
relegated polarization to the SI Appendix.396
The relationship in the data between our fractionalization397
and polarization measures is displayed in SI Appendix Fig-398
ure S4. After filtering out country averages (Panel B), the399
two diversity measures are highly correlated though the cor-400
relation is far from perfect. It is therefore useful to replicate401
our baseline Table 1 using polarization measures instead of402
fractionalization. Studying the role of ethno-linguistic polar-403
ization also provides a different perspective on diversity – the404
effect of being more bimodal versus simply more diverse. The405
results of the baseline specification using polarization instead406
of fractionalization are displayed in SI Appendix Table S3 with407
very similar results for primacy and somewhat weaker results408
for urban share.409
Further, we consider alternative measures for the outcome410
variables urban share and primate share reported in SI Ap-411
pendix Table S4. First we consider in columns (1) and (2)412
a narrower measure of the degree of urbanization by only413
considering city cores and dense towns in eqn (1), leading414
to similar results for both fractionalization and polarization.415
Then we consider an alternative definition of primate share.416
‡For the three outcomes the ranges are respectively 0.734-0.735, 0.824-0.826, and 0.615-0.618.
We draw on data from a joint OECD/EC project described in 417
(32) which offers a globally harmonized definition of commut- 418
ing zones called functional urban areas (FUA). We measure 419
primate city share as the FUA population divided by the broad 420
definition of urban population in the numerator in eqn (1). 421
We use the broad definition since FUA’s contain population in 422
less dense areas. Using this definition for primate city share in 423
columns (3) and (4) again yields very similar results for both 424
fractionalization and polarization. 425
Last, we explore the “modifiable areal unit problem 426
(MAUP)” (33, 34) and ecological correlations (35), which 427
could arise if results at the levels of (large) provinces do not 428
carry over to smaller spatial units. Put differently, our re- 429
sults could be sensitive to the definition and scale of units 430
for which data are collected. One way to investigate this is 431
to split our provincial sample in two, according to the scales 432
of provinces (area or population); and then check whether 433
the findings hold similarly for the samples of countries with 434
smaller versus larger provinces. This is what we do in SI 435
Appendix Tables S5 and S6. In the former table we split the 436
sample according to average population area (unweighted and 437
population-weighted), while in the latter we split according 438
to average province population and the number of provinces 439
in a country. For both small and large province samples, in 440
all cases, we continue to find large negative effects of ethnic 441
fractionalization on urban share and primate share, with no 442
clear pattern of whether results are stronger for the small or 443
large province samples. We conclude that the modifiable areal 444
unit problem is not driving our results. 445
Discussion and Role of Policies. The above results tell a stark 446
story of ethno-linguistic diversity slowing down urbanization 447
and urban concentration, hence potentially affecting economic 448
development. Still, there may be room for policies to dampen 449
the extent of this relationship. One natural candidate for a 450
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Fig. 4. Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization, Conflict and Urban Concentration: Results
for Different Aggregation Levels. Regression results of the two measures of urban con-
centration and conflict incident on ethno-linguistic fractionalization, at all 15 linguistic
aggregation levels. Panel A and B: the regressions performed control for country fixed
effects, ruggedness and 1975 population density and 1975 outcome variables, as
specified in columns (2) and (6) of the lower panel of Table 1. Panel C: the regressions
performed are as specified in column (3) of SI Appendix Table S8. Point estimates
are shown as dots and confidence intervals at the 95% level as bars.
policy dimension that may be able to modulate ethnic tensions 451
is democracy. In particular, there exists evidence that while 452
full, consolidated democracy reduces the risk of ethnic tensions 453
and conflict, nascent or fragile/intermediate democracies may 454
bear higher risks of political violence than autocracies (3, 455
36).§ Hence, in what follows we shall investigate whether the 456
impact of ethnic fractionalization is magnified in countries 457
with intermediate democracy levels. 458
In particular, we interact our fractionalization measure 459
with three regime types: full democracy, intermediate regime, 460
full autocracy. We control for the full set of fixed effects 461
and other baseline controls (ruggedness, population density), 462
including the 1975 levels of the urban variables in panel B. 463
Results are reported in Table 2. In the first columns (1)–(2) 464
the democracy measure is taken from the Polity IV project 465
(38), while in columns (3)–(4) we rely on democracy scores 466
from Freedom House (39). The overall picture emerging from 467
Table 2 is that indeed the impact of ethnic diversity on urban 468
share and primate share tends to be distinctly magnified in 469
intermediate regimes. However, the differences in coefficient 470
magnitudes in many cases are statistically weak and stronger 471
for primacy than for urban share (see tests at the bottom of the 472
panels for details). Hence, these results need to be interpreted 473
with caution. We find similar patterns in SI Appendix Table S7 474
for ethnic polarization, as for fractionalization. 475
Data Availability. All data used in this study are from pub- 476
lic and commercial data sources as described in the SI Ap- 477
pendix. Generated data and code to generate variables 478
and results are publicly available at the Harvard Dataverse 479
(https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PLDXPD). 480
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Supporting Information Text18
Data19
The main data sources are described in detail below.20
Population Data. Calculating historical linguistic indices and contemporary population densities alike require some form of21
fine-grained population data, preferably available for multiple periods from the same source to ensure consistency over time.22
We use gridded population data by the Global Human Settlement (GHS) project’s 1 sq km “population grid” (GHS-POP,23
(1)), available for the years 1975, 1990, 2000 and 2015, derived from GPW4, and provided by the European Commission,24
Joint Research Centre and Columbia University, Center for International Earth Science Information Network. GHS generates25
population counts per grid cell by dis-aggregating population data of administrative units (CIESIN GPWv4) into grid cells based26
on built-up cover (impermeable surface) as determined primarily from Landsat satellite imagery (Global Human Settlement27
Layer, GHSL) for the respective year. The Global Human Settlement Layer is an initiative of the European Commission’s Joint28
Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Development, and the GEO Human29
Planet Initiative which maps built-up cover from satellite imagery. We calculate ethno-linguistic indices based on population30
data for the year 1975 and the urban outcome measures on population data for the year 2015.31
Urban Boundary Data. Our main dependent variables measure the fraction of urbanized population in provinces and the fraction32
of the largest primate city within the urban population. To define these variables as precisely as possible, a globally consistent33
definition of meaningful population density thresholds is required. We take information on the degree of urbanization from the34
GHS “Settlement Model layers” (GHS-SMOD, (2)). This data set defines seven population density groups and assigns a group35
to each 1 sq km grid cell: City cores (at least 50,000 inhabitants with cells having at least 1500 per sq km), dense towns (5,00036
to 50,000 inhabitants meeting the 1500 density requirement per cell), semi-dense towns (5,000 to 50,000 inhabitants meeting a37
density requirement of 300 people per sq km and 2 km distance to the next city core or dense town), suburbs (accounting38
for the residual inhabitants of the urban cluster having density over 300 people per sq km) and three low-density, i.e. rural39
categories. This classification is based on the formation of contiguous areas of high-density cells and the total population within40
such areas (2). Our primate city in each province is based on these GHS core cities boundaries, summing the grid square41
populations within those boundaries.42
The two panels of Figure S1 illustrate –for the regions of Northern France, Belgium, Netherlands and Southern UK– how43
the classification into settlement categories (right panel) allows for a clear distinction between urban and rural population44
clusters and gives us agglomerations such as cities and towns, while the left panel shows the underlying population densities.45
Note, in this part of Europe, only the center of Paris in the left panel shows really high population densities over 20,000 people46
per square km.
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Fig. S1. Degree of Urbanization in Europe, 2015. The left panel depicts raw population data from the GHS population grid (GHS-POP), with a population density per km2
ranging from 0 (uninhabited) to 45,263 (Central Paris). The right panel shows the seven urbanization classes from the GHS Settlement Model grid (GHS-SMOD), which are
used to define urban and city core populations in our outcome variables.
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Indo-European (448)




































Fig. S2. Ethnologue Language Tree for Switzerland. The graph depicts the language tree of Switzerland. Swiss languages are divided in up to 11 levels, with level 1 being the
most aggregated and level 11 being the least aggregated level. The endpoint (underlined) of each branch depicts the commonly-referred name of a language. The language
tree is based on data by the Ethnologue.
Language Data. To calculate province-level ethno-linguistic fractionalization and polarization, we require information on the48
number of speakers per language in each province. We obtain information on the spatial distribution of languages from the49
19th edition of the World Language Mapping System (WLMS), the georeferenced counterpart of the Ethnologue (3).∗ This50
map covers most parts of the world with polygons, each depicting the extent of a traditional language, as it occurred in the51
early/mid 1990s. The data accounts for multilingual regions by letting language polygons overlap. The scale of reporting varies52
across regions: while languages in many parts of the Old World appear to be well-documented, the recording is limited in53
regions subject to past large-scale migration waves, such as Oceania and South America ((4)). After data cleaning, we identify54
6,208 country-language pairs (when focusing on the finest level of language distinction, level 15), with the median (mean)55
country having 6 (26.64) languages. Linguistic diversity spans from mono-linguistic nations - mostly isolated island states such56
as Cuba, Iceland or Jamaica - to countries with complex linguistic nets - such as India, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea with57
391, 435 and 467 languages, respectively.†58
Not mapped are mostly unpopulated areas, such as deserts. Even though these areas are unlikely to have any impact on any59
of our variables, we interpolate missing data by assigning the closest language polygon. As discussed in the main text, various60
ways exist to compute ethno-linguistic diversity, depending on what threshold is used for distinguishing different languages.61
For very high levels of aggregation (Level 1) only mere major language families are considered different when computing62
diversity measures, while low levels of aggregation (Level 15) result in distinguishing very fine-grained differences between63
similar languages. Figure S2 illustrates the branches of the language tree for one country, Switzerland, to supplement the64
example of the province of Himachal Pradesh, India in the text.65
To illustrate how the various levels of thresholds of the language tree map into diversity measures, compare Figure 1 in the66
main text which displayed ethno-linguistic fractionalization around the world for the most fine-grained level 15, with Figure S367
where we display the analogue world map of ethno-linguistic fractionalization at the province level for the most aggregate level68
1. Unsurprisingly, using a higher level of disaggregation results in more clear-cut differences between areas and leads to higher69
∗WLMS has recently been used by e.g. (4–6). Note that alternative global georeferenced group-level data include “Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups” and “Geo-referencing Ethnic Power Relations”. Both
are of high quality and frequently used in the related literature. Unlike WLMS, however, neither of the data sets reports all language speakers per country, which is crucial to adopt an iterative fitting
process in areas with overlapping group coverage.
†We exclude a set of mostly minor languages, due to insufficient information necessary for data processing: languages with unknown location; point languages with a population share smaller .5%;
languages without or unknown number of first language speakers; languages with insufficient linguistic tree information including “isolate languages” (no language trees available), “mixed languages”
(hybrids without clearly defined language trees) and sign languages.












Fig. S3. Global Map of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (Tree Level 1) at the Province Level. Fractionalization is calculated at language tree level 1. See text for data sources
and construction.
computed diversity scores.70
Note that some languages require special attention, for instance those not bound to a specific region, but spread throughout71
a country, known as “widespread languages”, e.g. Russian speakers in Uzbekistan. We distribute widespread language speakers72
uniformly across a country, which is equivalent to spanning a polygon along a country’s boarders. Further, a small number of73
languages are marked as a point in the WLMS raw data when the location of speakers within a country is known, but not the74
extent of their geographical spread. We then follow (6) and draw a circle around these points, proportional in size to the share75
of speakers in the country.‡ The last unmapped language class in WLMS describes languages for which neither the location, nor76
the geographic extent is known. We choose to omit those languages, as we are unable to assign them to the correct province.§77
Combining all the above steps results in a fully polygonized ethno-linguistic map, making use of all available information.78
In a next step, we allocate local populations to the languages spoken in each province. This task would be straightforward79
in the absence of spatial overlaps of languages or if province-level language speaker numbers were available in case of on overlap.80
Unfortunately, neither is the case, making the assignment of local populations to spoken language consequently more complex81
in multilingual regions. To address this issue, we employ an iterative proportional fitting algorithm, a statistical procedure that82
assigns people in a certain region to a language, conditional on the nation-wide share of speakers. This procedure has been83
recently applied in a similar context by (6), whose steps we follow.84
We prepare the data by converting the linguistic map into K 1 km grid cells. There are M languages spoken in a country.85
The data can thus be organized in a K ×M dimensional matrix B, where each column represents a language and each row86
accounts for a single grid cell. Next, we assign the value 1 to element bkm if language m is spoken in cell k, 0.0000000487
otherwise. The rationale behind assigning a small positive value rather than zero to languages not spoken in a cell is to88
account for intrastate migration. For instance, while it is highly likely that at least some Canadian French speakers moved to89
Vancouver at some point, the linguistic data does not map them accordingly. We address inconsistencies in the linguistic map,90
by distributing a small amount of Canadian French speakers across Canada.¶ In addition, we define a K × 1 matrix N , with91
each cell’s GHS population count. Finally, the 1×M dimensional matrix L contains the total number of speakers per language92
in that country (the data is obtained from the Ethnologue). The iterative proportional fitting process adjusts the elements of93
matrix B such that row and column totals sum up to the corresponding entry in matrix N and L, respectively. The algorithm94
follows the steps below:95
1. Proportionally adjust each row’s sum to equal entries in matrix N : Divide each row by its row-total, then multiply each96
column by N .97
2. Proportionally adjust each column’s sum to equal entries in matrix L: Divide each column by its column-total, then98
multiply each row by L.99
3. Repeat steps 1) and 2) until convergence is reached.100
‡Languages representing less than .5 % of the country’s population are omitted, because they would otherwise result in very small, and most likely imprecise circles.
§Omitted languages are relatively small, with speakers representing on average only a tenth of those from mapped languages. In addition, a third of these have insufficient information or are classified as
sign languages, hence not revealing any information of ethnic affiliation.
¶(6) assign 0.000001 to each 25 sq km (5 km × 5 km) grid cell. We proportionally adjust this value to our 1 sq km grid cells: 0.000001/25 = 0.00000004. A small positive amount is further
desirable because exclusively positive values in matrix B guarantees convergence, as shown in (7).
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In other words, the process re-balances the values in matrix B until (i) the sum of all speakers in a cell equals the GHS cell101
population count, and at the same time (ii) the sum of each language’s speakers across all cells equals the total of speakers in102
the Ethnologue.‖103
Polarization and Fractionalization Measures. In Figure S4 we display graphically the relationship between our polarization104
versus fractionalization measures. While these diversity measures are obviously positively related, they are far from identical.105
This is intuitive given that polarization measures take high values for settings with two dominant groups of similar size, while106
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Fig. S4. Ethno-linguistic Polarization and Fractionalization. Scatter plots studying the relationship between fractionalization and polarization at level 15 of the language tree
across 3,540 provinces in 170 countries. In the right panel, each the country mean of each variable is subtracted.
Administrative boundaries. National and first-level administrative boundaries are from the Digital Chart of the World “Province”108
data set for the year 2000. The median (mean) country has 27 (49.80) provinces. The unit of observation of the regression109
analysis is based on countries’ first-level administrative boundaries. For instance, the unit of observation is a state for the110
United States and a Bundesland for Germany. We prefer this data set over alternative options, among others because WLMS111
is also based on Digital Chart of the World’s national boundary data.112
Further variables. Throughout the manuscript and appendix we also include a series of control variables which we shall describe113
in some detail in what follows. In particular, ruggedness data by (8) is used to calculate the province average of the “Terrain114
Ruggedness Index”, an index measuring irregularities in the local terrain, based on elevation data and first defined by (9).115
The variable is measured in units of hundreds of metres and the granularity of the underlying elevation data is 30 arc-seconds.116
Population density (1975) is calculated by dividing province populations in 1975 by land area. Population numbers are derived117
from the GHS Population Grid (1) and land area is based on all land pixels defined in (2). Elevation depicts the province118
average altitude, based on data by (10) and in units of hundreds of metres, with a granularity of the underlying data of 30119
arc-seconds. Latitude is measured at the province centroid and specifies the geographic north–south position in decimal degrees.120
Distance to coast measures the spherical distance between province centroids and the nearest coast line, based on data by the121
Digital Chart of the World 2000. The variable is reported in kilometres. Capital in province measures the spherical distance122
between province centroids and the according capital city, based on capital location data by (11). # Conflicts (1946-1974)123
depicts the number of conflict events between 1946 and 1974, derived from conflict data by the “Geographical Research on124
War, United Platform” (GrowUP, (12)). Provincial GDP (1990) measures the total GDP per province for the year 1990, based125
on “Gross Cell product” (purchasing power parity) data by (13), a data set globally available at the 1 by 1 decimal degree level.126
All distance-based variables are calculated in ArcGIS.127
Descriptive statistics. Drawing on the aforementioned data sets, we are able to construct our main variables of interest used in128
the main text. The descriptive summary statistics of these measures are displayed below in Table S1.129
‖For a more detailed discussion of this procedure, please consult (6).
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Table S1. Descriptive summary statistics of main variables
Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variables:
Urban share (2015) 3540 0.63 0.26 0.00 1.00
Primate share (2015) 2368 0.52 0.29 0.01 1.00
Ethnicity Indices:
Fractionalization (Level 1, 1975) 3540 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.80
Fractionalization (Level 8, 1975) 3540 0.23 0.26 0.00 0.98
Fractionalization (Level 15, 1975) 3540 0.26 0.28 0.00 0.98
Polarization - (Level 1, 1975) 3540 0.16 0.27 0.00 1.00
Polarization - (Level 8, 1975) 3540 0.32 0.33 0.00 1.00
Polarization - (Level 15, 1975) 3540 0.34 0.32 0.00 1.00
Control variables:
Ruggedness (100m) 3540 1.12 1.21 0.00 8.88
Population density (population/km2, 1975) 3540 0.29 0.96 0.00 13.42
Urban share (1975) 3540 0.54 0.29 0.00 1.00
Primate share (1975) 1712 0.54 0.29 0.01 1.00
The unit of observation is a province.
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Selection on unobserved variables130
The practical formula in (14) is β∗ = β1 − δ(β0 − β1)(R2max − R21)/(R21 − R20). In this, β∗ is an estimator that converges to131
the true coefficient, β0 the estimated coefficient without controls and β1 the coefficient with controls; R20 and R21 are the132
corresponding R2’s. δ has an upper bound of 1 under equal selection (unobservables and observables equally related to the133
treatment), which we assume. R2max is the maximum explanatory power obtainable from included and omitted variables,134
excluding measurement error and purely idiosyncratic items. We think measurement error is fairly high for urban share given135
the controversies in defining urban, although perhaps less so for primacy which is a ratio where different measures of city136
populations affect both the numerator and denominator. We also note that, in our case, when we control for the lagged137
dependent variable, we are in essence controlling for the effect of all omitted variables on at least historical populations and we138
think of the R2 ’s in panel B of Table 1 as being pretty much at the maximum, before measurement error. We note in Table S2139
in columns 4 and 8 when we add in the long list of controls with the lagged dependent variable present, the R2 relative to140
columns 1 and 5 changes by less than 1.5%. We could take a very conservative view by assuming R2max = 1, which would give a141
possible bias of +0.032 for urban share and +0.052 for primacy, which still leaves noticeable negative effects of fractionalization142
on both outcomes. However it is unreasonable to assume no measurement error or pure noise in these two cases. For the text,143
in both cases we set R2max = 0.9, which still may be conservative. We then estimate for fractionalization in Table 1, Panel B,144
col. (2) and (5) as the estimate with controls, β1, for urban share and primate share, respectively. We compare this to the145
estimated effect of fractionalization in a bivariate regression without any control variables beyond fractionalization and with no146
country fixed effects. The estimated coefficient of these bivariate regressions are β0 = −0.140 (standard error clustered for147
countries = 0.062, R2 = 0.022, N = 3540) for urban share and β0 = −0.300 (s.e. = 0.061, R2 = 0.081, N = 1623) for primate148
share.149
Robustness checks150
In what follows we shall display a series of robustness tables that we have discussed at length in the main text. In Table S2151
we include a battery of further control variables capturing terrain, location, economic, political and past historical conflict152
characteristics that could potentially influence the potential growth of cities (see the detailed description of these control153
variables above).154
Further, in Table S3 we replicate the results of the baseline specifications but focusing on ethnic polarization instead of155
fractionalization. Moreover, Table S4 estimates the baseline specifications, but focusing on alternative definitions of urban156
share and primate share. For urban share we apply a narrower measure of total urban population by only considering city cores157
and dense towns in eqn (1). For the primate share, the OECD has a project to define commuting zones of cities worldwide,158
which they call functional urban areas [FUA] (15). In Table S4 primacy is measured as the FUA population divided by the159
broad definition of urban population in the numerator in eqn (1). We use the broad definition since FUA’s contain population160
in less dense areas.161
To investigate the potential sensitivity of our results to the size of provinces, we split our sample according to the scales of162
provinces (area, population, etc) in Tables S5 and S6. While in the former we split the sample according to average population163
area (unweighted and population-weighted), in the latter the sample is split according to average province population and the164
number of provinces in a country. In each case the splits are intended to divide provinces into equal size groups. All provinces165
in a country are put in one or the other group, so the number of countries in each sample differs.166
Finally in Table S7 we replicate findings of Table 2 in the main text on policy analysis, but focusing on ethic polarization167
rather than fractionalization.168
As discussed in depth in the main text, for all the aforementioned sensitivity checks our findings continue to hold.169
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Table S2. Robustness to Alternative Control Variables
Sample: Restricted sample
Dependent variable: Urban share Primate share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Cross sectional
Fractionalization -0.107∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Ruggedness -0.011∗∗ -0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.018∗∗ 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Population density (1975) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008)
(Population density, 1975)2 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
(Population density, 1975)3 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)






Capital in province 0.189∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.028)
# Conflicts (1946-1974) -0.000 -0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Provincial GDP (1990) 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.515 0.514 0.585 0.549 0.459 0.459 0.556 0.511
Panel B: Longitudinal
Fractionalization -0.054∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Ruggedness -0.009∗∗ -0.007∗ -0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Population density (1975) 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.022) (0.003)
(Population density, 1975)2 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
(Population density, 1975)3 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)






Capital in province 0.079∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021)
# Conflicts (1946-1974) -0.000 -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GDP (1990) 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Urban share (1975) 0.591∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.058)
Primate share (1975) 0.819∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.039)
Adjusted R2 0.735 0.734 0.744 0.746 0.826 0.827 0.831 0.838
Provinces 3540 3540 3540 3061 1623 1623 1623 1459
Countries 170 170 170 147 138 138 138 120
Country FE X X X X X X X X
The unit of observation is a province. Variable definitions and sources are outlined above. OLS estimates are reported in all columns. Robust standard
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The regressions control for country fixed-effects. Statistical significance is represented by
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table S3. Ethno-linguistic Polarization and Urbanization Patterns
Dependent variable: Urban share Primate share
Sample: Full sample Full sample Restricted sample
Controls: No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Cross sectional
Polarization -0.085∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.025)
Adjusted R2 0.465 0.513 0.358 0.460 0.334 0.453
Panel B: Longitudinal
Polarization -0.012 -0.011 -0.048∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Urban share (1975) 0.615∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.048)
Primate share (1975) 0.849∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031)
Adjusted R2 0.731 0.734 0.823 0.825 0.823 0.825
Provinces 3540 3540 2359 2359 1623 1623
Countries 170 170 154 154 138 138
Country FE X X X X X X
Ruggedness X X X
Population density (1975) X X X
The unit of observation is a province. OLS estimates are reported in all columns. Robust standard errors clustered at
the country level are reported in parentheses. “Restricted sample” refers to the set of provinces with data available on
the outcome variable for 1975. The regressions control for country fixed-effects. Statistical significance is represented
by ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table S4. Robustness to Alternative Urban Definitions
Sample: Restricted sample
Dependent variable: Urban share (core and dense) Primate share (FUA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)











Urban share (core and dense, 1975) 0.546∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049)
Urban share (1975) 0.521∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.073)
Adjusted R2 0.742 0.741 0.513 0.512
Provinces 3540 3540 2407 2407
Countries 170 170 156 156
Country FE X X X X
Ruggedness X X X X
Population density (1975) X X X X
The unit of observation is a province. OLS estimates are reported in all columns. In columns 1-2, the de-
pendent variable employs a narrower definition of urban population, with the numerator only considering the
population located in city cores and dense towns and the denominator still capturing the whole province popu-
lation. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable uses an alternative primate share definition, with the numerator
capturing the province-wide population within “Functional Urban Areas”, derived from data by GHS (15) and
the denominator based on the baseline definition of the urban population (city cores, dense towns, semi-
dense towns and suburbs). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
“Restricted sample” refers to the set of provinces with data available on the outcome variable for 1975. The
regressions control for country fixed-effects. Statistical significance is represented by ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05,
∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table S5. Robustness of Provinces as Unit of Observation (Area-based Sample Splits)
Sample: Restricted sample
Splitting criteria: Average province area Average province area (population weighted)
Dependent variable: Urban share Primate share Urban share Primate share
Sample split criteria: <median >median <median >median <median >median <median >median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Cross sectional
Fractionalization -0.166∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.019) (0.045) (0.027) (0.044) (0.019) (0.042) (0.028)
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.469 0.486 0.366 0.492 0.465 0.510 0.366
Panel B: Longitudinal
Fractionalization -0.101∗∗∗ -0.031∗ -0.138 -0.066∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.136 -0.065∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.016) (0.087) (0.022) (0.030) (0.017) (0.083) (0.022)
Urban share (1975) 0.667∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.045) (0.065) (0.047)
Primate share (1975) 0.821∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.039) (0.058) (0.040)
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.672 0.842 0.772 0.742 0.676 0.831 0.781
Provinces 1784 1756 615 1008 1833 1707 583 1040
Countries 73 97 52 86 77 93 55 83
Country FE X X X X X X X X
Ruggedness X X X X X X X X
Population density (1975) X X X X X X X X
The unit of observation is a province. OLS estimates are reported in all columns. The sample is split according to country-wide province features. In columns
1-4, odd (even) columns only consider provinces located in countries with a below (above)-median average province area, with the province area calculated
in ArcGIS. In columns 5-8, odd (even) columns only consider provinces located in countries with a below (above)-median population weighted area, i.e. with
the province area weighted by GHS population counts for 1975. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The
regressions control for country fixed-effects. Statistical significance is represented by ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Ulrich J. Eberle, J. Vernon Henderson, Dominic Rohner, and Kurt Schmidheiny 11 of 16
Table S6. Robustness of Provinces as Unit of Observation (Population-based Sample Splits and Number of Provinces per Country)
Sample: Restricted sample
Splitting criteria: Average. province population (1975) Number of provinces
Dependent variable: Urban share Primate share Urban share Primate share
Sample split criteria: <median >median <median >median <median >median <median >median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Cross sectional
Fractionalization -0.085∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.077 -0.125∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.026) (0.054) (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) (0.034) (0.030)
Adjusted R2 0.491 0.486 0.506 0.357 0.519 0.519 0.402 0.518
Panel B: Longitudinal
Fractionalization -0.056∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.030 -0.072∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.095∗∗
(0.033) (0.022) (0.065) (0.027) (0.020) (0.031) (0.026) (0.040)
Urban share (1975) 0.635∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.052) (0.040) (0.081)
Primate share (1975) 0.822∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.037) (0.030) (0.064)
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.674 0.831 0.780 0.719 0.752 0.817 0.834
Provinces 1790 1750 440 1183 1775 1765 815 808
Countries 84 86 53 85 138 32 106 32
Country FE X X X X X X X X
Ruggedness X X X X X X X X
Population density (1975) X X X X X X X X
The unit of observation is a province. OLS estimates are reported in all columns. The sample is split according to country-wide province features. In columns
1-4, odd (even) columns only consider provinces located in countries with a below (above)-median average province population, with population counts
based on GHS data for 1975. In columns Columns 5-8, odd (even) columns only consider countries with a below (above)-median number of provinces.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The regressions control for country fixed-effects. Statistical significance is
represented by ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table S7. Policy Implications: The Role of Democracy (Polarization)
Sample: Restricted sample
Data source: Polity Freedom
Dependent variable: Urban share Primate share Urban share Primate share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Cross sectional
Polar. × Democracy -0.108∗ -0.011 -0.157∗∗ -0.021
(0.061) (0.046) (0.062) (0.046)
Polar. × Intermediate regime -0.114∗ -0.239∗∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.087) (0.027) (0.048)
Polar. × Autocracy -0.052∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.038) (0.026) (0.052)
Adjusted R2 0.526 0.470 0.511 0.459
P(Test: Democracy = Int. regime) .947 .022 .111 .078
P(Test: Int. regime = Autocracy ) .358 .172 .99 .965
P(Test: Democracy = Autocracy) .386 .107 .107 .083
Panel B: Longitudinal
Polar. × Democracy -0.013 -0.003 -0.044 -0.014
(0.029) (0.030) (0.036) (0.026)
Polar. × Intermediate regime -0.069∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.105∗∗
(0.039) (0.047) (0.019) (0.044)
Polar. × Autocracy -0.002 -0.060 -0.012 -0.052
(0.022) (0.036) (0.024) (0.038)
Urban share (1975) 0.552∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.059)
Primate share (1975) 0.813∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.037)
Adjusted R2 0.726 0.823 0.725 0.820
P(Test: Democracy = Int. regime) .248 .015 .297 .079
P(Test: Int. regime = Autocracy ) .121 .166 .698 .354
P(Test: Democracy = Autocracy) .766 .232 .441 .404
Provinces 2627 1245 2776 1313
Countries 117 103 131 110
Country FE X X X X
Ruggedness X X X X
Population density (1975) X X X X
The unit of observation is a province. OLS estimates are reported in all columns. Robust standard errors clustered
at the country level are reported in parentheses. Polarization is interacted with variables capturing the degree of
democratization in countries in 1975. Columns 1-2: Data on democracy is derived from the variable “Polity" by the
Polity IV Project (16). Democracy refers to the third of countries with the highest Polity score. Autocracy refers to the
third of countries with the lowest Polity score. Intermediate refers to the remaining third of countries with an intermediate
Polity score. Columns 3-4: Data on democracy is derived from the variable “Freedom Status" by Freedom House (17)
evaluating political rights and civil liberties (accessed via the Quality of Government data catalogue). Democracy refers
to countries classified as “Free". Autocracy refers to countries classified as “Not Free". Intermediate refers to countries
classified as “Partly Free". The regressions control for country fixed-effects. Statistical significance is represented by
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Supplementary results170
In Table S8 we show results when regressing conflict measures on ethno-linguist fractionalization and polarization. In the table,171
we report the results of cross-sectional regressions at the province level, covering 3,170 provinces across 151 countries. Our172
ethno-linguistic diversity measures remain the same as throughout the paper. We have three dependent variables: count of173
conflict incidents in a province from 1975 to 2015 (estimated as a Poisson count model) in columns 1 and 2, conflict incidence174
(i.e. equals 1 if at least 1 conflict event present within 1975-2015) which is the extensive margin in columns 3 and 4, and count175
of incidents in a province conditional on there being a least one incident (also done as a Poisson) which is the intensive margin176
in columns 5 and 6. The Poisson overall count in columns 1 and 2 covers aspects of both the intensive and extensive margins–177
whether there are zero conflict incidents and, when positive, how many. To construct these variables, we draw on disaggregate178
data from “Geographical Research on War, United Platform” (GrowUP, (12)).179
We generally find a strong and statistically significant association between our ethno-linguistic diversity measures and these180
armed conflict measures, especially for fractionalization. This table is consistent with the view that part of the costs of bigger181
cities in ethno-linguistically diverse areas could be related to higher risk of political tensions and violence.182
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Table S8. Ethno-linguistic Diversity and Conflict
Sample Full sample
Dependent variable: Overall Extensive margin Intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fractionalization 0.757∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.053) (0.121)
Polarization 0.410∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.213∗
(0.122) (0.025) (0.109)
Mean Dep. var. 4.021 4.022 .218 .218 18.416 18.416
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.614
Pseudo R2 .672 .668 .554 .552
Provinces 3169 3169 3166 3166 691 691
Countries 154 154 151 151 87 87
Country FE X X X X X X
Ruggedness X X X X X X
Population density (1975) X X X X X X
The unit of observation is a province. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a count variable of the
total number of events between 1975 and 2015. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is a dummy
indicating conflict incidence. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to provinces with at least 1 conflict event.
Poisson estimates are reported in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, and OLS estimates in columns 3-4. The regressions
control for country fixed-effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the country
level. Statistical significance is represented by ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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